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I. Introduction
The evolution of hydrologic fracturing has revolutionized America’s
economy on a global scale. 1 Over the past 15 years, technology has made it
possible to extract billions of barrels and oil and gas from geologic
formations “once thought to be out of reach.” 2However, with new methods
come new demands; technology provides the ways, water provides the
means. 3Water provides not only the vehicle for bringing up the fractured
minerals extracted from the formation, it allows for the efficient processing
of hydrocarbons after exiting the well. 4 To achieve energy independence
through hydrologic fracturing—massive quantities of fresh water are
needed. 5
1. See Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. Water footprint of hydrologic
fracturing, Environmental Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (2015): 276-280
(describing the demand of relative volume of hydrologic fracturing in the context of
comparable industries).
2. Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the Context of
Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 (State Bar of
Texas, Fall 2017).
3. See Clark, Corrie E., Robert M. Horner, and Christopher B. Harto. Life cycle water
consumption for shale gas and conventional natural gas. Environmental science &
technology 47, no. 20 (2013): 11829-11836 (detailing the use of water throughout the
hydrologic fracturing process).
4. See López-Díaz, D.C., Lira-Barragán, L.F., Rubio-Castro, E., You, F. and PonceOrtega, J.M., 2018. Optimal design of water networks for shale gas hydrologic fracturing
including economic and environmental criteria. Clean Technologies and Environmental
Policy, 20 (10), pp. 2311- 2332 (describing the reason why fracing requires fresh water).
5. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.5, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (focusing on the statistics of oil and gas production in the major formations in
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Depending on the geologic formation, millions of gallons of water per
well utilizing the hydrologic fracturing method are required to maintain
steady operations. 6 Fracing operations in the Eagle Ford Basin could use
between an estimated 943 million barrels (a barrel equal 42 gallons of
water) to as much as 5.3 billion barrels of water per year, depending on the
rate of productivity. 7 Similarly, fracing operators in the Permian Basin
could reach 8.8 billion barrels of water per year by 2030.8 This amount of
water demand is equivalent to the yearly demand of the state of New
Jersey.9 It is estimated the United States demand for water in the use of
hydrologic fracing will grow exponentially as technology finds new
untapped formations. 10 Technology will provide new ways to extract
minerals from the earth while conserving this valuable commodity, water.
As with any earthly mineral, fresh water is not unlimited. While concerns
have been increasing with regard to the use of virgin water during fracing
operations, especially during drought conditions, operators have been able
to efficiently extract precise amounts of groundwater according to each

Texas); Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. Water footprint of hydrologic fracturing.
Environmental Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (2015): 276-280. (explaining the use
of water during hydrologic fracturing requires massive quantities).
6. See Kondash, Andrew, and Avner Vengosh. Water footprint of hydrologic
fracturing. Environmental Science & Technology Letters 2, no. 10 (2015): 276-280.
(quantifying the number of gallons of water required to maintain a producing well).
7. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.5, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (focusing on the statistics of oil and gas production in the major formations in
Texas).
8. Id.
9. See U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, U.S. Geological Surv., Cheryl A. Dieter, Molly A.
Maupin, Rodney R. Caldwell, Melissa A. Harris, Tamara I. Ivahnenko, John K. Lovelace,
Nancy L. Barber & Kristin S. Linsey, Estimated Use of Water in the United States in 2015,
Circular 1441, 9 (June 19, 2018), https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/cir1441
[https://perma.cc/272A-PGX7] (quantifying the use of the fresh water needs of the state of
New Jersey in order to compare it to the demand for fresh water usage in fracing operations).
10. See Jean-Philippe Nicot, Anna K. Hebel, Stephanie M. Ritter, Steven Walden1,
Russ Baier1, Peter Galusky, James Beach, Richard Kyle, Leigh Symank & Cari Breton, Tex.
Water Dev. Bd., Current and Projected Water Use in the Texas Mining and Oil and Gas
Industry, 205 (June 2011), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/contracted_
reports/doc/0904830939_MiningWaterUse.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2GP-2F6X] (utilizing a
holistic view of future water use projected in Texas fracing operations).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

480

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 6

formation.11 Anticipating the growing need for freshwater, operators of
fracing wells have developed recycling techniques to purify flowback water
able to be utilized again. 12 On average, operators have developed a way to
recycle up to 40% of the original water used in fracing operations so that it
could be used again—without the need to use additional virgin freshwater.13
Such virgin groundwater is distinguished from water produced from oil
bearing formation, which formation water is not covered in this comment.
However, much of the recycled water product was not used again for
fracing, but sold by operators for other industry needs or used on other
tracts of land; by selling this recycled water or by using on other tracts of
land, operators have created an economy that not only reduces their
operating costs, but can also be said to limit the environmental impact. 14
11. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.5, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (describing how operators have become very efficient at using exact fresh
water quantities).
12. See Water Conservation & Technology Center, Fact Sheet Planning Component 8:
The Eagle Ford Hydrologic Fracturing Water Planning Services, Texas A&M Univ. (Jan.
2013) (on file with author) (describing the water purification systems utilized in fracing
operations); see also Shale and Tight Resources, https://www.chevron.com/operations/shale
[https://perma.cc/H9Z7-CNFX] (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (describing how a large producer
has taken advantage of water recycling technology in the fracing industry).
13. See generally Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the
Economic Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water
Recycling Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017)
(quantifying the amount of recycled water operators can use again or sell); Jason
Schumacher and Jennifer Morrissey, The Legal Landscape of "Fracing": The Oil and Gas
Industry's Game-Changing Technique Is Its Biggest Hurdle, 17 Tex. Rev. Law & Pol. 239
(Spring 2013) (describing the amount of flowback water generally produced in one well
when hydrologic fracing).
14. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (describing how the Operators have created a market for
waste water that would have otherwise been permanently lost through traditional disposal
methods). See also, Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the
Economic Motivations Behind Operator- Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water
Recycling Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017)
(describing the value of water owned by surface owners in a number of different industrial
uses); 2019 Sustainability Report, Sustainable Development Program, Pioneer Natural
Resources,
http://www.pxd.com/sites/default/files/reports/2019-Sustainability-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MQW-2WKV] (outlining the way a major operator will “Increasing the
use of recycled produced water in hydrologic fracturing”).
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With the price of recycled water selling from ten to seventy-five cents per
barrel, it is estimated operators can make over one million dollars per well
per production cycle. 15 From the perspective of the operator, recycling
fracing water is a matter of economics.
The expansion of hydrologic fracing has made Texas not only the
industry leader, but the legislative vanguard of oil and gas exploration and
extraction. 16 Over and over again, it is to Texas to which other states mirror
their fracing regulations.17 The Texas Railroad Commission (“RRC”) has
been steady in its regulation of the oil and gas industry in Texas—balancing
the needs of both the surface and mineral estate—while maintaining
mineral exploration and exploitation essential to Texas’s economy. 18 With
the “hydrologic fracturing revolution” the Texas Legislature in 2013 and
2019, has tried to be proactive in maintaining the integrity of the oil and gas
industry in relation to surface and mineral estate owners. 19 Changes to the
15. See Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the Economic
Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water Recycling
Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017)
(comparing how the value of water sold to hydrologic fracturing producers can be more
lucrative than traditional cattle farming).
16. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 19,
https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“per barrel water acquisitions costs in seven Permian Basin counties with
averages ranging from a low of $.48 per barrel in Howard Country to as high as $1.02 per
barrel in Eddy County”); see also Mark Kaufman, We're fracing the hell out of the U.S.A.
Can a president slam on the brakes?, Yahoo! News (June 26, 2019), https://news.yahoo.com/
were-fracing-hell-u-president-165440714.html [https://perma.cc/3E6T-2J3N] (focusing on
the expansion and future of fracing in Texas and the legislation surrounding its regulation).
17. See generally Marathon Oil led an initiative to remove barriers to using produced
water in New Mexico, https://www.marathonoil.com/Sustainability-Report/Highlights/
Water-Management/ [https://perma.cc/NKG8-KRAL] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019)
(describing the way a major producer and operator will look to the New Mexico Legislature
to change the law in the same way they lobbied the Texas Legislature).
18. See generally Railroad Commission of Texas, Oil & Gas Exploration and Surface
Ownership,
https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-explorationand-surface- ownership/ [https://perma.cc/689E-8A7Y] (last updated July 18, 2016)
(providing context to how the agency for regulatory oversight interacts with operators and
surface owners within the context of oil and gas exploration).
19. See Act of May 28, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 201, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 209
(amended 2015 and 2019) (current version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.002)
(understanding the evolution of fracing technology, the Texas Legislature has amended this
code three times in the past 6 years); see also Yes, No, Maybe So: Uncertainty in Texas
Groundwater Withdrawal for Hydrologic Fracturing, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1227, 1236 (2015)
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Natural Resource Code Chapter 122 have tried to keep up with the general
practices of the evolution of fracing technology. 20 In 2013, the Texas
Legislature would first address the treatment of post fracing waste. 21
However, changing the law to favor the operators at the expense of the
surface owners during fracing operations—in an industry where the
production of value is hundreds of millions of dollars per day—had the
potential to produce unanticipated consequences. 22
Water treatment technology is not a stranger in the energy sector; nor is
the practice of recycling industrial waste. Therefore, it is essential to limit
the scope and properly define the terms within this comment. The principles
of law and conclusions throughout this comment are specific to
“groundwater entirely produced by the surface estate (and the lands pooled
therewith) subject to mineral production on a tract therein.” 23 This comment
will exclusively focus on what is commonly referred to as a severed estate
subject to no prior contracts or surface use agreements. As used throughout
this comment “surface owner” or “surface estate” means all interests in the
fee simple estate (whether severed or not), except the mineral estate granted
to or reserved by the mineral interest owner (i.e., the fee simple title save
(“The Texas legislature made numerous unsuccessful attempts to address this ambiguity”);
Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Executive Summary: Sustainable Produced
Water Policy, Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry:
2019
and
Beyond,
(Sept.
16,
2019),
https://texasalliance.org/white-paper/
[https://perma.cc/944V-MA4D] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (“Texas took an early lead in
recognizing the potential value of recycling and began updating its regulatory framework in
2013”).
20. See Act of May 28, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 201, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 209
(amended 2015 and 2019) (current version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.002)
(understanding the evolution of fracing technology, the Texas Legislature has amended this
code three times in the past 6 years).
21. See generally Act of May 28, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 201, § 1, 2013 Tex. Gen.
Laws 209 (amended 2015 and 2019) (current version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter
122.002) (understanding the evolution of fracing technology, the Texas Legislature has
amended this code three times in the past 6 years).
22. See generally Andrew R. Thomas, Fracing Keeps the Gas Pedal on U.S. Economy,
Industry Week (March 26, 2019) (explaining the impact of the United States fracing industry
on the global economy); Permian Basin Petroleum Association, Economic Impact of Oil and
Gas Industry in Texas, https://pbpa.info/industry-statistics [https://perma.cc/GE3S-G4HA]
(last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (“[t]he oil and gas industry paid over $15.7 billion in Texas state
and local taxes and royalties in fiscal 2014 and a total $98.9 billion in Texas state and local
taxes and royalties from 2007 through 2015”).
23. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (matching terminology with language used in the practice of
oil and gas law).
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the title to the minerals in place); “mineral estate” means those interests
held by the mineral interest owner. 24 “Operator” means the companies
exploring and exploiting the minerals through hydrologic fracturing. This
comment does not cover ground water which has been sold by the surface
owner to the operator.
There are many stakeholders in the economy of hydrologic fracturing. 25
For example, Regulatory agencies, environmental agencies, state and local
governments, and independent business operators all have a part to play at
any one stage of the fracing process.26 However, even though this comment
does not intend to delve into the interests of the above-mentioned
stakeholders—by focusing on the surface and mineral estates—the
consequences will reverberate amongst these stakeholders. The regulation
of finite minerals will increasingly become more important.
This comment will focus on House Bill 3246 and its impact in the
context of surface and operator conflicts; specifically, the common practice
of operators recycling post-fracing wastewater. Further, this comment will
assert the enforcement of the provisions in House Bill 3246 as outlined in
the Texas Natural Resources Code Chapter 122.002 constitutes a
constitutional regulatory taking of the water, being an attribute of the
surface estate, when operators use recycled water to service acreage other
than the producing tract of land, or acreage pooled within. Part II of the
comment will explain the division of rights existing between the surface
estate owner and the mineral estate owner. Part III will describe the
legislative history of House Bill 3246 and the interest of the Legislature in
revising the Texas Natural Resources Code. Part IV will analyze the effect
of House Bill 3246 on surface owners and conclude that as applied, Texas
Natural Resources Code Chapter 122.002 is a regulatory taking. Part V will
conclude and provide context into this unique area of the law. The real
24. Id.
25. See Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law Conference,
Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities and Potential
Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the number of parties involved
in dealing with post fracing waste in the context of operators and third parties).
26. See generally Railroad Commission of Texas, Water Use in Association with Oil
and Gas Activities, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gasfaqs/faq-water-use- in-association-with-oil-and-gas-activities/ [https://perma.cc/Z5UKNDEB] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (providing context to how the agency for regulatory
oversight interacts with other agencies within the context of oil and gas exploration); Peter
E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the Context of Water
Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21 (State Bar of
Texas, Fall 2017) (describing the enforcement and regulatory power in the context of water
treatment and usage).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

484

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 6

property doctrine of correlative rights creates a usufruct interest in the
groundwater allowing the operator to use the water to exploit the minerals
for benefit of the land or acreage pooled therewith. The statute then
attempts to expand the usufruct right of use into an ownership interest in the
backflow water.
II. Division of Rights
Texas gives a fee simple owner proprietary rights and constitutional
protections to every molecule or atom located underground within the
property boundary.27 The mineral interest owner will have the dominant
interest over the surface estate.28 It is important to establish what rights and
substances are reserved when the minerals are severed. Traditionally, the
hydrocarbons in place are owned by the mineral estate while groundwater is
part of the surface estate.29 Moreover, this severability is always subject to
the terms of the conveying instrument or contract.30
27. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012) (quoting
“[I]n our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and
gas in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must
be considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. The
oil and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns
separately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded the
usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market
value.”); see also Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948) (quoting
“[E]ach owner whose land overlies the basin has a like interest, and each must of necessity
exercise his right with some regard to the rights of others”).
28. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (“[T]he oil and gas
lessee’s estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express
provision for payment of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the
owner of the surface estate.”); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971)
(quoting “[I]t is well settled that the oil and gas estate is the dominant estate in the sense that
use of as much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to produce and remove the
minerals is held to be impliedly authorized by the lease; but that the rights implied in favor
of the mineral estate are to be exercised with due regard for the rights of the owner of the
servient estate.”); Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1961) (citing “[W]e agree
that the owner-operator of the lease has the right to use so much of the land, both surface and
subsurface, as is reasonably necessary to comply with the terms of the lease contract and to
carry out the purposes and intentions of the parties.”); TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686
S.W.2d 346,349 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (holding the mineral estate is the "dominant estate").
29. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (quoting “[W]ater,
unsevered expressly by conveyance or reservation, has been held to be a part of the surface
estate.”); See also Fleming Found. v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Ct. App.
1960) (holding “[t]he reservation of oil, gas and other minerals does not include the subsurface water.”); City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Tr., 269 S.W.3d 613 (Tex.
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Texas jurisprudence and regulatory governance dictates a balance
between correlative rights and the rule of capture. 31 The delicate dance
created by correlative rights in the use of groundwater have limited the
outright exploitation of hydrocarbons at the expense of the surface estate in
four major ways: the accommodation doctrine32, the reasonable and nonnegligent use of the surface33, usufructuary water rights34, and beneficial
surface use for the mineral estate.35 These well-established doctrines work
together to ensure balance between the rights of the surface owner and
mineral owner, when interests may not always align. 36 Because the mineral
estate is dominant, the accommodation doctrine tempers these implied
rights by stating the mineral interest owner must, if reasonably able to do
so, give due regard to the surface owner’s existing current use of the
surface.37 Along these same lines, the mineral owner must use its implied

Ct. App. 2008) (quoting “[U]nder the rule of capture a person owns all of the [water or] oil
and gas produced by a well bottomed on his own land, even though the well may be draining
the substances from beneath other property”).
30. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (“[W]ater,
unsevered expressly by conveyance or reservation, has been held to be a part of the surface
estate.”).
31. See 2 Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015) (“the Railroad Commission’s duty to protect correlative
rights exists side by side with the common-law rule of capture.”).
32. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808,810 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas
lessee’s estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express
provision for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the
owner of the surface estate.”) (emphasis added).
33. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (Quoting “[T]he oil
and gas lessee’s estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an
express provision for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is
reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights
of the owner of the surface estate.”) (emphasis added).
34. See Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973)
(explaining the use of the implied right by the dominant estate does not extend to an
ownership interest in the property used); In re Adjudication of Water Rights of Upper
Guadalupe Segment etc., 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) (“[a] usufruct has been defined
as the right to use, enjoy and receive the profits of property that belongs to another”).
35. See 501 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1973) (explaining the use of the implied right by the
dominant estate must not be for the benefit outside that of the surface estate boundaries).
36. See 2 Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015) (“Because Texas conservation statutes never define
correlative rights, the courts have filled the void.”).
37. See generally Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex. 1971) (establishing
the mineral interest owner must take into account reasonable alternatives when operating
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right of the surface in a reasonable and non-negligent manner.38 The last
two limiting doctrines are of the upmost importance for the purposes of this
comment39
A. Use Versus Ownership
Use is not ownership. Correlative rights of the severed mineral interest
owner are expressly usufructuary.40 The Texas Supreme Court utilizes the
present right to use only when conceptualizing the implied surface use right
by the dominant estate.41 In both the Sun Oil and Robinson v. Robbins
Petroleum Corp. opinions, the court takes pains to describe these rights in
terms of “use” and not of ownership. 42 In Sun Oil, the court reiterates “the
implied grant of reasonable use extends to and includes the right to use
water from the leased premises in such amount as may be reasonably
necessary to carry out the lessee’s operations under the lease.”43
Robbins Petroleum Corp. would not only further usufructuary nature of
the implied right to use, but would state “the water itself is an incident of
surface ownership in the absence of specific conveyancing language to the
contrary.”44 It is in this concept that the dominant estate is dominant,

under the implied right of use; further, the mineral estate must do so in a non-negligent
manner).
38. Id.
39. See Coyote Lake Ranch, LLC v. City of Lubbock, 498 S.W.3d 53, 64 (Tex. 2016)
(“Common law rules governing mineral and groundwater estates are not merely similar; they
are drawn from each other or from the same source”).
40. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (“Since a mineral interest owner’s right to water is
usufructuary—giving it a present right of use only—it cannot sell that which it does not
own.”) (emphasis in original).
41. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (“In each instance, the court’s recognition of a mineral
interest owner’s implied right of surface use implicitly recognizes the surface estate owner’s
ownership of the surface. Second, the court’s language confines surface use to effectuating
the purposes of the mineral lease”).
42. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (describing the
rights of the mineral interest owner in terms of use); Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp.,
501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973) (explaining use of the surface estate and not ownership of
the property used).
43. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (adding the qualification
of reasonable use of the surface estate by the operator).
44. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. 1973)
(qualifying the usufruct can be modified by any legal contractual agreement).
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without this usufruct, mineral interest owners would have no way to extract
minerals without an agreement with the surface owner.
The reiteration of use over ownership is not inconsequential, it is
essential to how Texas law balances the interests of a severed estate. Also
important, are the ancillary and regulatory interactions between the state
and the oil and gas industry. This comment seeks to provide background
into how the oil and gas industry has been regulated previously to provide
context to the impact of House Bill 3246. To understand how operators
must interact with statutory and regulatory obligations, every stage of the
fracing process must be understood in terms of the legislative purview.
B. The Legal Relation of Water to Its Practical Use
There is no question that groundwater is an attribute of the surface
estate. 45 The mineral estate is the dominant estate. 46 Because of the
dominant estate status, Texas allows capture of those minerals through
reasonable use of the surface estate. Operators looking to exploit minerals
may in a practical sense, use the surface to effectuate their exploitation. 47
The means by which operators effectuate the use of the surface estate
during the process of hydrologic fracturing is a multi-tiered approach—
every tier requires fresh groundwater. 48

45. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831-32 (Tex. 2012) (holding
“In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas
in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be
considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. The oil
and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns
separately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded the
usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market
value.”).
46. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas lessee’s
estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision
for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the owner of the
surface estate.”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
47. See TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. App.—Eastland
1985) (“A grant of minerals would be worthless to a grantee if he could not enter upon the
land for exploration and extraction of the minerals granted.” (quoting Ball v. Dillard, 602
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980))).
48. Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process,
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the four-stage
process requiring freshwater).
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1. From Groundwater to Well-Head
Once operators begin the process of drilling and fracing, one of the first
steps is to acquire significant amounts of fresh water, usually by way of
freshwater wells drilled on the surface estate. 49 The water extracted by the
operator is then pumped to storage tanks or large ponds closer to the well
head.50 These fresh water storage ponds are usually filled days prior to the
beginning of injecting the water into the well. 51 The operator is very
cautious not to lose or contaminate any freshwater during this early stage by
ensuring proper transportation of the freshwater through pipes or by trucks
and properly casing the wellbore. 52 Throughout this process, involving
significant and expensive infrastructure, the legal ownership of the water
has not changed. 53 Legal ownership has not changed under common law,
Texas jurisprudence, or even acting within the changes outlined in Natural
Resources Code Chapter 122.002. This means, where the surface owner has
not sold the water to the operator, the surface estate still owns all the water
in the storage tanks, the storage ponds, inside transportation pipes and
trucks, and at the wellbore. Once again, operators have only a usufruct
when it comes to land use of the surface estate, including groundwater.54
At no point in the stages prior to pumping the freshwater down the
fraced well, does Texas jurisprudence qualify or describe freshwater in any
49. Id. (describing the location and storage of fresh groundwater during the process of
fracing).
50. See Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process,
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the location and
storage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. Chapter 122.002 (providing no condition of the
freshwater ownership status prior to exiting the well as “wastewater”; without any express
change within the law, it is valid to consider groundwater to be owned by the surface); See
also Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 19, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (describing the economic benefit of investing large amounts of infrastructure
during oil and gas operations).
54. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1972) (“The oil and gas lessee’s
estate is the dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision
for payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the owner of the
surface estate.”) (emphasis added).
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other sense than being a fee simple proprietary ownership right of the
surface. Texas common law doctrine of ensuring the mineral estate is
dominant has evolved with technology, but fundamentally, still provides
both estates benefit from this doctrine. 55 Surface owners who purchase after
the land has been severed, have undoubtedly done so at a discount.
Likewise, mineral interest owners who negotiated the purchase price of
their interest have done so with the hope that their interest will be
productive.56 Therefore, Texas common law understands surface owners
most likely have already benefited from their interest prior to the
exploitation of the mineral estate. 57 Because of this concept, the scale of this
usufructuary right is not a factor in changing the delicate balance of
ownership between the estates.
Further, with the Edwards Aquifer opinion, Texas jurisprudence put an
end to any question pertaining to the ownership of groundwater. 58 Coupled
with Texas’s common law, this decision solidified groundwater as a part of
the realty, for this comment, that is to say, groundwater will be considered
part of the surface; “We now hold that this correctly states the common law
regarding the ownership of groundwater in place.” 59 Therefore, during this
stage, absent any contractual agreement, legal ownership of groundwater is
still a vested property right of the surface estate.

55. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. Number One v. Haupt, Inc.: “It
is a well-established doctrine from the earliest days of the common law that the right to the
minerals carries with it the right to enter and extract them, and all other such incidents
thereto as are necessary to be used for getting and enjoying them. This common law right
was created “because a grant or reservation of minerals would be wholly worthless if the
grantee or reserver could not enter upon the land in order to explore for and extract the
minerals.” 854 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Harris v.
Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1944)).
56. Standard Oil and Gas Surface Use Agreements often include costs of affecting
hunting and fishing activities; these agreements take into account many factors of the surface
owner’s use of his own land.
57. See TDC Engineering, Inc. v. Dunlap, 686 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex. App.—Eastland
1985) (“A grant of minerals would be worthless to a grantee if he could not enter upon the
land for exploration and extraction of the minerals granted.” (quoting Ball v. Dillard, 602
S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1980)).
58. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 832 (Tex. 2012) (“By ownership
of groundwater as real property, the Legislature appears to mean ownership in place”).
59. Id.
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2. From Well-Head to Mineral Formation and Back
With millions of gallons of freshwater prepped and in frac ponds prior to
fracing, the legal ownership has not changed. 60 During this process, four
distinct stages require large amounts of freshwater to effectuate the fracing
operation. 61 These stages utilize the extracted groundwater for the purpose
of effectuating hydrocarbon extraction. As the freshwater and chemical
mixture is pumped thousands of feet into the formation below, legal
ownership between the surface owner and the operator regarding the
groundwater has not changed. 62
During the acid stage, several thousand gallons of fresh water are used to
dissolve material in the well bore.63 This is not always required for every
formation; the necessity of this stage depends on the calcium concentration
within the rock formation. The pad stage demands approximately 100,000
gallons of freshwater be forced down the well bore to prime the pump and
to allow the bore to reach pressure. 64 The prop stage allows the operator to
add either fine or course material to make the capture of the minerals more
efficient. This stage can use up to one hundred thousand gallons of
freshwater.65 After the capture of minerals, freshwater is again used in the
flushing stage to flush out additional material from the well prior to closing
it.66 No matter how many chemicals are introduced during these stages,
98% to 99.5% of the material pumped into the well is water and sand. 67
It is important to distinguish common practices among operators at this
stage of the operation. After the formation is fractured and the operator
begins pumping out fluid from the well, the concurrent process of
60. See Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process,
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the volume and
storage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing).
61. Id.
62. See Frac Focus Chemical Disclosure Registry, Hydrologic Fracturing: The Process,
https://fracfocus.org/hydrologic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydrologic-fracturing-process
[https://perma.cc/DW5V-QUDX] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (describing the location and
storage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing); See also See Tex. Nat. Res.
Code § 122.002 (providing no condition of the freshwater status prior to exiting the well as
“wastewater”).
63. Id. (describing the first stage of fresh groundwater use during the process of
fracing).
64. See Id. (describing the second stage of fresh groundwater during the process of
fracing).
65. See Id. (describing the third stage of fresh groundwater during the process of
fracing).
66. See Id. (describing the last stage of fresh groundwater during the process of fracing).
67. Id.
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separating minerals, water, and chemicals can begin. 68 Once separated, the
minerals go to the producer, the chemicals are either reused or disposed of,
and the water is transported away by truck or pipe to salt water disposal
wells.69 Traditionally, the operator paid for a waste disposal service to truck
away the water, sand, and chemicals to an offsite deep injection well. 70
Alternatively, the operator could provide its own waste disposal service
or entirely contract out waste disposal services.71 Even though the water
was being trucked to a disposal site located off the land of the surface
owner, surface owners were happy to permit operators to dispose of the
unusable water because the operator was statutorily obligated to properly
dispose of post-fracing waste.72 However, this “implied permission” did not
transfer any property rights.
Texas has distinguished the chemical composition of groundwater owned
by the surface estate from other similar liquid materials found underground.
In Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., the operator took saltwater from
the surface estate to re-pressurize the mineral formation for the oil-bearing
rock to remain stable. 73 Relying on the word “water” in the lease, the
operator argued it was only liable to reimburse the surface owner for the
freshwater used.74 “Water,” to the operator, meant only freshwater. The
Texas Supreme Court disagreed, “[W]ater is never absolutely pure unless it
is treated in a laboratory. It is the water with which these parties are
concerned and not the dissolved salt. . . . [T]he saline content has no
consequence upon ownership.”75
The next year the Texas Supreme Court lent further insight into
identifying groundwater in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West.76 In Humble
Oil, a dispute arose between an operator and royalty interest owner
pertaining to the comingling of native gas and produced gas.77 The court
held, “the confusion of goods theory attaches only when the commingled
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law Conference,
Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities and Potential
Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the number of parties involved
in dealing with post fracing waste in the context of operators and third parties).
72. See tit. 16, pt. 1, ch. 3 Tex. Admin. Code, § 3.9 (2020) (providing regulations on the
use and treatment of “wastewater.”).
73. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Tex. 1973).
74. Id. at 867.
75. Id.
76. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1974).
77. Id.
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goods of different parties are so confused that the property of each cannot
be distinguished.”78
Therefore, if the surface-owned freshwater is going into the well as a
usufruct by the operator, it is an asset of the surface estate. When it is
mixed with chemicals, pumped down into the formation, and returned as
produced liquid, it becomes part of the production stream. However, when
operators recycle the produced liquid, the recycled water is separated from
the hydrocarbons. As in Humble Oil and Robinson, ascertaining what is
groundwater is a question of fact.
With the rise of water treatment technologies came the rise in operators
looking to take advantage of this common practice. 79 Instead of disposing of
the backflow water, operators set up treatment technologies to bring the
backflow water to a state clean enough to be reused. Once recycled, the
operators either sold the water for industrial use, reused it in the same well,
or stored it for future use (on either the same tract or a nearby tract). Thus,
operators created a market through ingenuity. 80 Depending on the
formation, operators recover up to 40% of the frac water when it flows back
through the wellbore.81
All questions concerning the use of groundwater are resolved when the
surface owner sells groundwater to the operator; because the cost of
groundwater sold by the surface owner to operators ranges from ten to
seventy-five cents—depending on demand and location—the cost of frac
water is a significant expense to the operator. Where the operator relies on
the doctrine of correlative rights, the use of the flowback water is limited to
use on the land covered by the lease, or acreage pooled therein. 82
Throughout the entire fracing process, the operator must dance the
delicate usufruct dance. Once the purchased backflow water is recycled, it
can be used for another tract of land or sold. Recognizing this proprietary

78. Id.
79. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (describing the effect market operators have created by
recycling fracing water).
80. See Id.. (describing the market operators have created by recycling fracing water).
81. See Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the Economic
Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water Recycling
Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017)
(comparing how the value of water sold to hydrologic fracturing producers can be more
lucrative than traditional cattle farming).
82. See Robinson, 501 S.W.2d at867 (explaining the use of the implied right by the
dominant estate does not extend to an ownership interest in the property used).
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issue, operators and producers sought help from the Texas Legislature to
codify their new practice.83
3. Voluntary Agreements or Legislative Intervention
Some operators and producers have invested billions of dollars into
water treatment technologies since 2013. 84 To protect their investment,
operators rely heavily on their relationships with landowners and future
legislative certainty. 85
In Texas, some operators have preemptively entered into surface use
agreements with landowners that contain groundwater sales provisions. 86
Unlike New Mexico, Texas does not have a surface use statute. These
surface use agreements are not required by the Texas Legislature or the
Railroad Commission, but merely codify the duties and obligations of each
party prior to and during operations. Contained within these agreements are
reimbursement rates not limited to wildlife killed by operations, land
damage, and the cost of groundwater used during all stages of the fracing
process.87 Even where the operator has no legal obligation to the surface
owner other than the common law doctrines described above, some
operators and producers contract with surface owners to express their
respective duties and obligations.
Given the massive investment in infrastructure required to exploit
minerals for each tract—and given the desire to take full advantage of this
83. See William C. Mumby, Trust in Local Government: How States’ Legal Obligations
to Protect Water Resources Can Support Local Efforts to Restrict Fracing, 44 Ecology L.Q.
195, 202 (2017) (“[S]tates act as the primary regulators of the practice.”). See also House
Comm. on Energy Resources, List of Witnesses, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg., R.S. (2019)
(describing the private parties testifying for and against House Bill 3246).
84. See generally Austin C. Whitmore, Oilfield Recycling in Texas: Why Command
and Control Regulations are Stifling the End Goal, 44 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 287, 292 (Sept. 2014)
(“A 2011 study by the Texas Water Development Board estimated that only 3% of injected
frac water is recycled in Texas.”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-12-5 (West) (outlining the
requirements of surface use agreements prior to the commencement of oil and gas
operations).
85. Marathon Oil led an initiative to remove barriers to using produced water in new
Mexico,
https://www.marathonoil.com/Sustainability-Report/Highlights/Water-Manage
ment/ [https://perma.cc/NKG8-KRAL] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (describing the way a
major producer and operator will look to the New Mexico Legislature to change the law in
the same way they lobbied the Texas Legislature).
86. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process).
87. Id.
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investment through backflow water recycling, it is sensible to stave off
conflicts by negotiating with the surface owner through a “groundwater
sales agreement” or “surface use agreement” prior to the commencement of
operations. As the water used in fracing becomes more valuable than cattle
ranching or agriculture, operators have anticipated conflicts with surface
owners—surface owners understand the importance of groundwater. Every
drop is important.88 For example, land owners have negotiated to calculate
of the volume payable by the quantity of the water measured at the well
head rather than the backside of the frac pond. 89
This simple detail can save the landowner thousands of dollars in lost
water sales. After being pumped from the ground, the water can sit in open
frac ponds for days or weeks before arriving at the fracing well site. If the
calculation occurs at the water well, evaporation is of no concern, but if the
operator calculates water use at the fracing site, operators are not paying for
any evaporated water.90 Because fracing operations require substantial use
of the surface estate, these practical details are of the utmost importance to
landowners.
Modern surface use agreements have anticipated conflict to the point that
operators have begun to buy the groundwater from the surface owner prior
to use—even when the operator has no obligation to do so. 91 Operators
understand the legal “grey area” of ownership when water is recycled and
have solved this issue with purchase agreements within surface use
contracts.92 However, given the expense of groundwater, operators have
solved one problem to buy another.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.6, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154- f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05 [https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“Hauling water away from well pads via truck can cost anywhere from $1 to
$5 per barrel depending on travel distance and terrain, which can be prohibitively expensive
when compared to the $.30 it reportedly costs to pipe water from a production well to a
disposal well.”).
91. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process).
92. See Gabriel Collins, Frac Ranching vs. Cattle Ranching: Exploring the Economic
Motivations Behind Operator-Surface Owner Conflicts over Produced Water Recycling
Projects, Issue Brief, Baker Inst. for Public Pol’y, Rice University (Oct. 17, 2017)
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The reason for recycling post-fracing water or backflow water is to lower
the operator’s costs. If operators are going to buy the water and recycle,
they have effectively lowered their margins only to the extent of the virgin
water saved. However, if operators do not purchase groundwater and must
therefore rely on the correlative rights doctrine limited in how and where
the backflow water may be used, “Costs expended on such technologies
would create no cost or economic benefits for the mineral interest owner,
and the implementation of water treatment technologies would yield to less
costly disposal well alternatives.”93 Thus, operators and producers began to
look for legislative ways to protect their recycling investments without the
need for legally preemptive surface use agreements.
III. Legislative History and Importance
A. Regulatory History of Oil and Gas in Texas
With the Texas Railroad Commission (“RRC”) and Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) gently stepping around the regulatory
use of water for oil and gas operations, it is easy to become lost in the
practical process of how operators use water. The scope of water use for
operators must always be described, absent written agreement and for the
reasons stated above, in terms of usage. 94 Therefore, groundwater always
begins as an asset of the surface estate, or the estate where the severance
has occurred, but is not granted to the lessee under the terms of a typical oil
and gas lease. 95 Its use is dictated according to the common law doctrine of
correlative rights. The historical evolution of mineral law in Texas has
nourished the oil and gas industry in many ways. 96
(comparing how the value of water sold to hydrologic fracturing producers can be more
lucrative than traditional cattle farming).
93. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (describing the market that operators have created by
recycling fracing water).
94. Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1961) (“We agree that the owneroperator of the lease has the right to use so much of the land, both surface and subsurface, as
is reasonably necessary to comply with the terms of the lease contract and to carry out the
purposes and intentions of the parties.”) (internal citation omitted).
95. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d at 810 (“The oil and gas lessee’s estate is the
dominant estate and the lessee has an implied grant, absent an express provision for
payment, of free use of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due regard for the rights of the owner of the
surface estate.”) (internal citation omitted).
96. See generally John Burritt McArthur, Stewarding Public Oil, Gas, and Hard
Minerals: The Express and Implied Development Rights that Protect Public Resources, 9
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Recognizing the importance of being an energy leader throughout the
world, Texas legislative acts have gone to great lengths to perfect property
rights in relation to the theory of mineral ownership in place. 97 The goal of
oil and gas legislative regulation has been the ability of lawmakers and
regulators to balance the exploration and exploitation of natural resources
with the absolute right of property ownership.98 Even though the methods of
exploration and production have been revolutionized through technology,
the legislature has sought to reinforce the moniker of the independent
producer, “rise early, work hard, strike oil.” 99
The primary way the Texas Legislature ensured the perpetuity of the
hydrocarbon energy sector was how it structured the oversight of the energy
industry.100 Texas established the Railroad Commission in 1890, but it
wasn’t until 1917 that the legislature declared pipelines to be “common
carriers” that the RRC was able to regulate the energy industry. 101 From
1917 to 1939, the legislature would enact new statutes or amend the Natural
Resource Code a total of thirty-six times. 102
These acts would serve to clarify the scope and authority of the RRC in
comparison with the ever-growing oil and gas producers; these acts would

Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 215, 250 (July 2014) (treats leases obligating lessees to produce
by the end of the primary term as requiring actual production in paying quantities); see also
2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (“Texas governors, legislators, attorneys general, and
Railroad Commissioners are concerned not just with preventing waste in the oil and gas
fields but with the state’s economy as a whole—with employment levels, tax revenues,
investment opportunities, and the maintenance of competition. When the size of the state’s
oil and gas wealth became apparent, its distribution among citizens also became a political
matter.”).
97. See Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015) (Not surprisingly, the Texas Legislature enacted various
tax incentives to offset the deteriorating market conditions faced by the oil industry.”); see
generally 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (outlining the evolution of Texas’ statutory
scheme incentivizing exploration and production of oil and gas).
98. See generally 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (outlining the evolution of
Texas’ statutory scheme incentivizing exploration and production of oil and gas).
99. J. Paul Getty Quotes, BrainyQuote.com, 2019. https://www.brainyquote.com/
quotes/j_paul_getty_100065 [https://perma.cc/JS7P-FMFS] (last visited Dec. 18, 2019).
100. Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 153 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. 1941) (describing the
interaction between the regulatory institutions that affect the oil and gas industry).
101. See History of the Railroad Commission 1866-1939, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/
about-us/history/history-1866-1939 [https://perma.cc/JQ8N-XB5C] (last visited Dec. 30,
2019) (“Legislature declares pipelines to be common carriers, and gives Railroad
Commission jurisdiction over same. This is the first act to designate the Railroad
Commission as the agency to administer the conservation laws relating to oil and gas.”).
102. Id. (describing the major events in history for the Texas Railroad Commission).
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include the authority to issue statewide proration orders103, physical waste
standards104, market manipulation limitations 105, and the well spacing
rule. 106 In 1941, with the Lone Star Gas Co. v. State decision, the RRC rate
consideration orders were to be considered “legislative” in nature107.
Therefore, the RRC would be able to expand its regulatory authority and
scope without a specific enactment by the legislature. This is evidenced by
the decreasing number of changes to the Natural Resource Code in the
years following this decision. From 1940-1980, the legislature amended or
expanded the Natural Resources Code only another twenty-two times. 108
From 1980-2009, only four legislative changes occurred regarding the
Natural Resources Code. 109
To understand the relationship of the RRC and the legislature is to
understand energy politics in Texas—incentives to explore and produce oil
and gas in Texas go hand in hand with explicit and implicit rights of both
the mineral and surface estates. The current three RRC commissioners have
a combined total of 70 years’ experience in the energy, business, and
engineering sectors.110 They have worked both in the public and private
business sectors; and some have had experience in the financial sector. 111
Even though these commissioners are popularly elected or appointed by the
Governor during a vacancy in a largely conservative state, they are clearly
dedicated to their mission “to serve Texas by our stewardship of natural
resources and the environment, our concern for personal and community

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See History of the Railroad Commission 1980-1999, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/
about-us/history/history-1980-1999/ [https://perma.cc/GR4E-4FLV] (last visited Dec. 30,
2019) (describing the major events in history for the Texas Railroad Commission).
109. See History of the Railroad Commission, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/aboutus/history/history-2000-2009/ [https://perma.cc/2ZN3-D6LP] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019)
(describing the major events in history for the Texas Railroad Commission).
110. See 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.4 (2019) (“However, the authority to regulate the
oil and gas fields in Texas naturally carries with it the power to manage the Texas economy.
Railroad Commissioners are elected officials who operate in the same environment as the
lawmakers who create the policy framework. Not surprisingly, then, they have viewed their
role as managers of the Texas economy and have acted accordingly.”).
111. See Commissioners, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/commissioners/ [https://
perma.cc/W87N-FFBE] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (providing the background of the current
commissioners for the Texas Railroad Commission).
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safety, and our support of enhanced development and economic vitality for
the benefit of Texans.”112
The scope of the RRC’s regulatory power over the oil and gas is broad
and has expanded over time. First and foremost, correlative rights have
mainly been protected by the courts and statutory guidance because the
RRC has had a tough time walking the proprietary interest tightrope:
The Natural Resources Code evidences near-schizophrenia
regarding the commission’s power and duty to protect
correlative rights. Chapter 85 of the code, which involves oil
conservation, never uses the phrase “correlative rights.” Chapter
86 on gas conservation is replete with references to the need to
protect correlative rights. Chapter 111 on common carriers and
common purchasers is based on the principle that all producers
should have equal access, without discrimination, to pipelines, a
principle imbued with the concept of protecting correlative
rights. Chapter 102, the Mineral Interest Pooling Act, openly
acknowledges the protection of correlative rights as one of its
purposes. Yet nowhere in the code is “correlative rights” ever
defined. 113
“The directive of the RRC is not to define what interests parties currently
have, but to simply regulate and “protect the correlative rights of different
interest owners.”114 When there is a gap or need for interpretation, the
courts have filled the gap.
Just as confusing is how the RRC and the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality share the responsibility of regulating water for the
purpose of oil and gas exploration and exploitation. However, no matter
how confusing the relationship of regulation and legislative acts have
become, the theme has been steady— legislative acts evolve with the
regulatory nature of the oil and gas sector—and have generally not altered

112. Texas Railroad Commission Mission Statement, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/aboutus/organization-activities/mission-statement/ [https://perma.cc/N8JF-22Y7] (last visited Dec.
30, 2019).
113. Ernest E. Smith and Jacqueline Lang Weaver, 2 Texas Law of Oil and Gas 8.3
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015).
114. See Texas Railroad Commission, Oil and Gas Division, https://www.rrc.state.tx.us/
about-us/organization-activities/divisions-of-the-rrc/oil-gas-division/
[https://perma.cc/
KDF2-NLCA] (last visited Dec. 30, 2019) (explaining how the Railroad Commission
delegates its duties and responsibilities within the regulation of the oil and gas industry in
Texas).
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long established common law property rights. 115 The relationship of the
RRC and the Texas Legislature is not the aim of this comment; this
background is meant to provide context into why legislative intervention in
the oil and gas industry reverberates so profoundly.
B. Legislative History and Intent of House Bill 3246
Eight words contained in House Bill 3246 have changed the relationship
between surface owners and operators by codifying a practice which alters
property ownership in favor of one party, and transfers the same property to
another party, without means of compensation. 116 By breaking down the
way the legislature went about codifying this practice, the creation of my
first sentence in this paragraph is not an oversimplification.
The intent of the legislature was to codify the way operators dealt with
the “waste of oil and gas fluid.”117 By reframing the issue of groundwater
ownership in dealing with the post fracing fluid waste, the legislature seeks
to avoid expressly regranting proprietary rights.
Texas Representative Drew Darby introduced House Bill 3246 to clear
up the perceived “ambiguity relating to ownership between water haulers
and oil and gas operators.”118 Although this reasoning is factually true and
seeks to clarify the current practices of the operators, the intended
ambiguity to be resolved is not between haulers and operators—the legal
ambiguity of ownership is between the operators and surface owners.

115. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 24, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[Produced water] ownership is a private property issue, however its
management as a waste is the operator’s responsibility under the existing regulatory
framework.”).
116. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, H.B. 3246, 86th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste
fluid and why the change was necessary); H.B. 2767, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess., Ch. 209, § 1
(Tex. 2013) (amended 2015 and 2019) (2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 209 (West), current
version at Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 122.002 (West 2019)) (describing the changes to the
Natural Resources Code).
117. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, H.B. 3246, 86th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste
fluid and why the change was necessary).
118. Id.
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1. Waste or Water?
Crucial to all rights held in the law is how we define terms. In construing
a statute, “[o]ur primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature’s
intent, which we ascertain from the plain meaning of the words used in the
statute, if possible.” Southwest Royalties, Inc., 500 S.W.3d at 404. Stated
differently, “[i]f a statute is worded clearly, we must honor its plain
language, unless that interpretation would lead to absurd results.” Combs v.
Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013). “Undefined
terms in a statute are typically given their ordinary meaning, but if a
different or more precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the
context of the statute, we apply that meaning.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical
Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). “We further consider
statutes as a whole rather than their isolated provisions.”119
The Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.001 defines several terms used
throughout the statute. In the bill analysis, the author of the bill takes steps
to ensure that changes outlined in House Bill 3246 are uniform with other
definitions running throughout the Natural Resource Code.
The author of the bill seeks to ensure “waste” is properly defined.
“Waste” in terms of the Natural Resources Code is “fluid oil and gas waste
as waste containing salt or other mineralized substances, brine, hydrologic
fracturing fluid, flowback water, produced water or other fluid that arises
out of or is incidental to the production of oil and gas.”120 With the
definition of “waste” including “flowback water, produced water, or other
fluid,” the Natural Resource Code is using one definition to describe
multiple substances subject to differing ownership. 121
Practically, “waste” comes out of the fraced well altogether prior to the
operator separating hydrocarbons from the rest of the production stream. 122
Therefore, even when the freshwater is mixed with the fracing fluid during
the preparation stage, ownership of each ingredient of the fluid can be
ascertained. 123 For example, the freshwater, which was previously
119. Corning v. Hegar, 534 S.W.3d 28, 30 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017).
120. See House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg.,
R.S. (2019) (discussing how waste is defined in the context of oil and gas operations).
121. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246,
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid
and the why the change was necessary).
122. See Adrian C Hedden, Chevron Recycles, Reuses Fracing Water From Oil and Gas
as Permian Production Booms, (Nov. 2, 2019) https://www.currentargus.com/
story/news/local/2019/11/03/chevron-recycles-reuses-fracing-water-oil-gas/4121964002/
[https://perma.cc/5XTF-LJEK] (coming from a large producer and operator on how they
classify material coming out of the fracing well).
123. Id.
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groundwater and belonged to the surface owner where not purchased by the
operator and prior to it becoming frac fluid, is not “waste” but is part of the
usufruct of the operator; with the surface owner having the ownership
interest. However, when “every liquid incidental to the production of oil
and gas” is defined as “waste” after returning from the formation, any
application of this definition to describe ownership rights could potentially
conflict with multiple parties’ proprietary interests—the consequence of
this House Bill.124
As previously stated, surface owners are perfectly happy with the
operators dealing with all “waste” associated with fracing according to
statutory requirements; so that, “management of oil and gas waste has been
a cost absorbed by operators.”125 However, once the operators recycle the
water it is no longer “waste”, and they should not have acquired title to the
water.
2. Protecting the Investment
With fresh groundwater increasing in value and land owners becoming
more informed about the implementation of water treatment technologies,
operators and producers sought the assistance of the Texas Legislature to
codify the ownership status of post-fracing recycled wastewater. 126
Operators knew they were legally protected in extracting the groundwater
for use in their exploitation of the minerals, but in order to safeguard their
practices after exploitation occurs, establishing the right to production
stream and subsequent disposal was essential. 127
Supporters for the proposed change in the Natural Resource Code
avoided the impact this change in ownership could produce.
Acknowledging the cost of waste management operators absorb as a result
124. See House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg.,
R.S. (2019) (describing how the Texas Legislature defines waste).
125. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246,
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid
and the why the change was necessary).
126. See Managing Water Use in Hydrologic Fracturing, https://www.chevron.com/
corporate-responsibility/environment/water [https://perma.cc/KP6A-39P6] (last visited Dec.
30, 2019) (outlining how a major operator and producer manages water during fracing
operations).
127. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p. 25,
https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[i]n some cases, midstream customers have voluntarily paid a recycle
royalty just to “keep the peace” which makes recycling less competitive”).
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of fracing, legislators in support offered to allow operators to own the waste
they were already disposing of via deep salt water injection wells. 128
Supporters would further offer this change as an incentive to operators to
recycle and reduce the need for additional exploitation of fresh
groundwater.129 The solution legislators offer to land owners is “to account
for this in future agreements.” 130 This reasoning implicitly ignores the
practicality recycling has created within the system of proprietary rights
Texas has perpetuated.
Operators have no legal obligation or duty to contractually account for
“waste” with land owners in a severed estate. 131 As described above,
“preemptive” surface use agreements were utilized by operators to stave off
legal challenges when it came to the “grey area” of post recycled
water/waste. However, with the codifying of ownership of this material,
operators have no incentive to ensure the land owner interest in the of postfracing fluid (including previously injected groundwater). Practically, the
operator could only rely on correlative rights doctrine for its use of the land
owner’s groundwater from the commencement of operations until the
“water” returns to the surface of the fracing well—from now on, operators
can rely on Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.001 to legally protect them
after their implied usufruct has expired. 132 Therefore, with this change in
ownership, the benefit to operators is significant. 133

128. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246,
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid
and the why the change was necessary).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.002 (providing no condition of the freshwater
status prior to exiting the well as “wastewater.”).
132. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Chapter 122.001 (providing no condition of the freshwater
status prior to exiting the well as “wastewater.”).
133. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.6, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[h]auling water away from well pads via truck can cost anywhere from $1
to 5 per barrel depending on travel distance and terrain, which can be prohibitively
expensive when compared to the $.30 it reportedly costs to pipe water from a production
well to a disposal well”).
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With value of water increasing, whether fresh or recycled, opponents for
the bill understood the true consequence of the bill. 134 In other words, the
parties whose interests were not addressed in House Bill 3246 were the
parties whose legal rights were affected by House Bill 3246.
3. What is “Beneficial Use?”
Water is now a strategic planning factor for fracing operations and major
producers.135 One of the main goals of the bill was to incentivize operators
to recycle post fracing water by clarifying ownership after extracting the
minerals.136 By incentivizing recycling, the state would be said to have a
stronger reason to alter certain property rights. The House Bill sought to
incentivize recycling post-fracing water by stating the operator could own
the post-fracing water (“waste”) only if it takes the water for “the purpose
of treating the waste for a subsequent beneficial use.” 137 One of the issues in
understanding the overall aim of this House Bill is the legislature did not
define “treatment”—and more importantly, “beneficial use.”138
Prior to water treatment technologies, many operators would contract out
the waste disposal services after extracting the minerals. 139 These waste
removal services would transport all waste material to a treatment site well

134. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246,
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (describing the background on the issue of post fracing waste fluid
and the why the change was necessary).
135. See Adrian C Hedden, Chevron Recycles, Reuses Fracing Water From Oil and Gas
as Permian Production Booms, (Nov. 2, 2019) https://www.currentargus.com/
story/news/local/2019/11/03/chevron-recycles-reuses-fracingwater-oil-gas/4121964002/
[https://perma.cc/5XTF-LJEK]; see also Diamondback Energy Corporate Report, 2019, p.
10,
https://www.diamondbackenergy.com/static-files/5ab827ab-4b26-47ee-9e16-4d1b27
3d37a3 [https://perma.cc/MDZ3-RNRK] (including recycling statistics in corporate report,
one of the major operators in the Permian Basin stated “[o]ur use of recycled water for
completions increased to 10.7% of total water used in completions in 2018, compared with
less than 1% in 2017”).
136. See House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246, 86th Leg.,
R.S. (2019) (understanding the intentions of the Texas Legislature by introducing House Bill
3246).
137. Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 122.002.
138. Id.
139. See Adrian C Hedden, Chevron Recycles, Reuses Fracing Water From Oil and Gas
as Permian Production Booms, (Nov. 2, 2019) https://www.currentargus.com/story/
news/local/2019/11/03/chevron-recycles-reuses-fracing-water-oil-gas/4121964002/ [https://
perma.cc/5XTF-LJEK]; see generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas
Law Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems,
Opportunities and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the
contractual relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process).
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away from the fracing well. 140 Prior to injecting the waste in a deep-water
injection well, the waste treatment company would fill very large tanks with
the liquid waste, skim as much leftover hydrocarbons off the top, and sell
what they could (this is how they made a profit). 141 The rest would be
deposited in the saltwater disposal well. The operation of the waste disposal
company treating the liquid waste—albeit one could say treating the waste
to ensure all hydrocarbons are harvested for the beneficial use of not
returning hydrocarbons into the ground—could meet the meaning of
Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002.
While the House Research Organization bill analysis states “recycling
and treatment,” the final bill and Code are moot in describing the way
treatment of waste for a “beneficial use” are supposed to occur. 142 While the
bill analysis helps us understand the problem to be solved, the enacted
statute must be taken on its face. Without defining “beneficial use” in the
enacted statute, the threshold operators must meet to effectuate the transfer
of property ownership is ambiguous. Therefore, the specific intent of the
legislature to incentivize post-fracing waste water treatment may not be
realized.
IV. As Applied, Texas Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002 is a Taking
The relationship of real property in Texas has been balanced through
jurisprudence, proprietary doctrines, and, when necessary, legislative
statutes. This balance has defined an oil and gas industry that has led the
world in ground breaking technology and exploitation practices. However,
it takes two to tango. 143 Operators could not exploit minerals without the
rights given to them under the law (express or implied) or by agreement via
the surface owner. Therefore, legislation taking property from one estate to
give to another outright without compensation not only goes too far, but
effectively diminishes that original property value to zero.

140. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process).
141. Id.
142. Tex. Nat. Res. Code § 122.002.
143. See generally Gabriel Collins, How Produced Water's Economic Value is Evolving
in the Permian Basin, Shale Play Water Management, 22 October 2019, Houston, TX
(describing the multi-tiered decision-making process when operators think about treating
produced water).
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A. Current Interpretation of the Regulatory Taking Doctrine
The current regulatory taking doctrine has been relatively unchanged
since the Supreme Court decided Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City.144 The Penn Central decision outlined factors by which courts apply to
determine if government action, although not a direct invasion, has
constituted a taking. 145 By focusing on the nature and extent of the
regulation, the analysis will always be one of degree. 146 However, it is well
settled when regulation goes to a degree as to effectuate a total conversion
of value without compensation, it is a taking. 147 Total conversion is
construed as a regulation denying “all economically beneficial or
productive use of land.”148
Even when the government regulation does not effectuate a total
economic deprivation of the property, the Court will weigh factors to
determine the validity of the taking claim, including: the economic impact
of the regulation; interference with investor backed expectations; and the
“character of the governmental action.”149 The Supreme Court has made it
clear, property rights well established according to state law will be
respected.150 However, to that extent, property rights cannot be confiscated
by the government in favor of one party to the detriment of another.
Following the United States Supreme Court, the Texas Supreme Court
outlined two distinct categories for analyzing whether a regulatory taking
has occurred.
One is where regulation ‘compels the property owner to suffer a
physical ‘invasion’ of his property.’ The direct, physical effect
on property, though short of government possession, makes the
regulation categorically a taking. Another is “where regulation
denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” To
144. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
145. Id. (articulating that: “this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action
and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights”; see also Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (arguing that property regulated by the government can
be taking if “it goes too far”).
146. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 673 (Tex. 2004).
147. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922) (arguing that
property regulated by the government can be taking if “it goes too far”)
148. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017).
149. Id. (describing the factors courts should consider in takings cases); Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (describing the factors
courts should consider in takings cases); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 519 (1998)
(describing the factors courts should consider in takings cases).
150. Id.
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deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of land is
tantamount to depriving him of the land itself. But this is
‘limited to ‘the extraordinary circumstance when no productive
or economically beneficial use of land is permitted’” and ‘the
landowner is left with a token interest.’ In addition to these two
situations, the Supreme Court has stated that regulation ‘effects a
taking if [it] does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests.’151
With regulatory taking jurisprudence not as evolved as most constitutional
law, the Court cautions lower courts to look the totality of circumstances
surrounding the actions of the government, and must include “a factsensitive test of reasonableness.” 152 Because the government is not
physically invading the water rights of the surface owner, this analysis will
focus on the category in which the government deprives the owner of all
economically beneficial use of the property. 153
1. Standard of Review
To determine if a regulation completely deprives the owner of all
economically beneficial use, the court will make a determination of law if
any act by the government that “denies an owner economically viable use
of his land,” that regulation will constitute a taking. 154 Following the Lucas
decision, Texas considers the relevant factors to determine whether a
regulatory taking has occurred.155
The Texas Constitution mirrors the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution with respect to regulatory takings.156 While the Texas
Constitution does allow for the taking of private property for public use,
151. Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004).
152. Id.
153. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986) (“[G]iven the
propriety of the governmental power to regulate, it cannot be said that the Taking Clause is
violated whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of
another”).
154. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992).
155. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 671 (Tex. 2004)
(explaining the Texas Supreme Court uses an analogous standard of review for determining
a regulatory taking that the United States Supreme Court); see also Sloan Creek II, L.L.C. v.
N. Tex. Tollway Auth., 472 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015) (explaining what a party
needs to prove to have a successful takings claim).
156. Compare U.S. Const. amend. I (“nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”), with Tex. Const. Art. I, § 17 (“No person’s property shall be
taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation
being made”).
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Texas clarifies our issue at hand, “‘public use’ does not include the taking
of property… for transfer to a private entity for the primary purpose of
economic development or enhancement of tax revenues.”157
Currently, most Texas regulatory taking jurisprudence surrounds the use
of zoning ordinances or land use regulations. Therefore, it would be
difficult to determine what specific factors in the oil and gas sectors would
be considered by the Texas Supreme Court if this law was to be challenged
today.158 However, with the regulatory taking analysis proscribed by the
highest court in the land—House Bill 3246 as applied in Texas Natural
Resource Code Chapter 122.002 runs afoul of Article I § 17 of the Texas
Constitution.
B. Texas Natural Resources Code Chapter 122.002 is a Regulatory Taking
1. Deprivation of Economic Use
“Determining whether all economically viable use of a property has been
denied entails a relatively simple analysis of whether value remains in the
property after the governmental action.” 159
Waste not, want not. Recycled backflow water is not waste. As detailed
above, the process of the operator separating raw oil and gas products from
water prior to refining adds credibility to the notion—the transfer of title of
the surface water should not change just because it went down the pipe and
came back out.160
Historically, any liquid that was unrefined and sold by the operator was
disposed of in deep, salt-water injection wells; this liquid included surface
water that would be disposed of. 161 This did not change the nature of the
157. Tex. Const. Art. I, § 17.
158. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (“Each aims to identify
regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government
directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain. Accordingly, each
of these tests focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that government imposes upon
private property rights. The Court has held that physical takings require compensation
because of the unique burden they impose: A permanent physical invasion, however
minimal the economic cost it entails, eviscerates the owner's right to exclude others from
entering and using her property -- perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests”);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
159. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 935 (Tex. 1998).
160. See Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2011)
(“[w]hether the government's actions are sufficient to constitute a taking is a question of
law).
161. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities
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ownership, but the surface owner did not want to pay for nor be responsible
for the transportation and disposal of the flow back water and the operator
was obligated to deal with all wastes of all oil and gas.162 This comported
with current jurisprudence because the operator ceased using the “surface
water” once they extracted the minerals.
However, because operators have created a market for recycled fracing
wastewater, they have profited off property they have no ownership of. 163
House Bill 3246 by way of Texas Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002,
as applied in practice, allows for transfer of legal title of surface water to
the operators at the point the water returns from the pipe. Currently, this
backflow liquid is treated in totality by the Texas Legislature as “waste”
and property of the operator.164 Without compensation of the surface owner
for the surface water taken by the operator, this will violate Article I § 17 of
the Texas Constitution.165
Regardless of House Bill 3246’s intent, which seeks to clarify the
relationship between operators and third-party disposal or waste
transportation companies, the resulting consequence following this “state
action” is what surface owners will challenge, being the reduction of the
pecuniary value of the backflow recycle water to the land owner to zero.
In Texas, groundwater is a vested property interest. 166 That property
interest is specific, has value, and is transferable. This classification, as
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process).
162. See generally Institute for Energy Law, 6th Midstream Oil and Gas Law
Conference, Transporting Water for Oil and Gas Development: Problems, Opportunities
and Potential Solutions, (Dec. 2019) (copy on file with author) (discussing the contractual
relationships between parties at all stages of the fracing operational process).
163. See Peter E. Hosey & Jesse S. Lotay, Quench My Thirst: Water Rights in the
Context of Water Treatment Technologies, 42 Oil, Gas & Energy Res. Law Sec. Report 21
(State Bar of Texas, Fall 2017) (explaining the market operators have created by recycling
waste water).
164. See Blythe Lyons, John Tintera, Kylie Wright, Sustainable Produced Water Policy,
Regulatory Framework, and Management in the Texas Oil and Gas Industry: 2019 and
Beyond, Texas Alliance of Energy Producers, Independent Petroleum Association of
America, (Sept. 16, 2019), p.18, https://documentcloud.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn%3
Aaaid%3Ascds%3AUS%3A2c7b5154-f581-47dc-9c19-314d82c8de05
[https://perma.cc/
ZG7C-3PGQ] (“[t]he premise of the legislation is that this is an oil field waste issue and not
a water ownership issue”).
165. See Tex. Const. Art. I, § 17 (outlining what would constitute a regulatory taking
which would violate the Texas Constitution).
166. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831-32 (Tex. 2012) (holding
“In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas
in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be
considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. The oil
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previously mentioned in this comment, allows the operator to take the water
after its usufruct has expired, make it more valuable, and profitable for the
water owner. Once an operator invokes the terms of Natural Resource Code
Chapter 122.002, without bargaining for the property, they render the
surface owner’s property—water used for operations and recycled—
valueless. In effect, the surface owner is left with no economic value of the
property, violating Article I § 17 of the Texas Constitution.
2. Substantially Legitimate State Interest
The government may affect a partial taking if there is a “substantially
legitimate government interest,” such as encouraging recycling water. 167
Even though Texas Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002 produces a
total conversion, if the statute only produces a partial conversion of the
surface owner’s property, it would not violate Article I § 17 of the Texas
Constitution. However, because House Bill 3246’s intent does not match
the statute in practice, any state interest would not be substantial enough to
survive constitutional scrutiny.
The strongest state interest, subtly outlined in the bill’s analysis, would
incentivize operators to recycle water used during fracing operations. 168 By
incentivizing recycling, less virgin groundwater would be needed for
extraction by operators.169 The legislature believed if operators were given
statutory ownership of all post-fracing waste, including water, they would
be more inclined, not only to recycle the waste water, but also to use it for
further fracing operations. The state’s reasoning is flawed in the
assumptions it relies on. So far, operators already have access to the
necessary amount of fresh groundwater they need. Operators recycle
wastewater to use it in future fracing operations, and the amount of
freshwater operators extract will not decrease as a result of statutorily
defined ownership.

and gas beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns
separately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded the
usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market
value).
167. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004)
(explaining the scope by which courts will differentiate police powers and takings).
168. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246,
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (explaining that operators are less likely to recycle water if they
cannot profit from it).
169. See Shale and Tight Resources, https://www.chevron.com/operations/shale (last
visited Dec. 29, 2019) (describing how a large producer has taken advantage of water
recycling technology in the fracing industry).
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With the “grey area” solved by the legislature, operators have no reason
to extract less fresh ground water. The legislature assumed operators were
not recycling waste water because of the legal “grey area” of
use/ownership.170 To some degree they were, and in those cases, operators
preemptively entered into surface-use agreements or water-use agreements
with surface owners. However, operators have used recycled waste-water
for years.171
Further, with this legal “grey area” resolved, operators have no reason to
use less fresh groundwater or use recycled wastewater in their current
fracing operations, only to treat for a “beneficial use.” 172 With these
assumptions animating the intent of the statute, the practical reason for the
operators to recycle waste water is because they are incentivized by House
Bill 3246, and are far more likely to profit from cost savings from reuse, or
the potential income derived from selling the water.173
The statute’s change in wording, compared with the legal practicality it
has produced, was advertised as making a molehill out of a mountain;
changing the language was to clarify an ambiguity in the last stage of a
multi-tiered operation separate from any legal obligations. This would be
the case, if the operator already owned the water mountain.
3. Proper Exercise of Police Power?
The same case the Texas Supreme Court used to outline the vested
property interest of groundwater begins with the surface estate, it also
predicted future constitutional takings claims regarding groundwater:
“Suppose a landowner were prohibited from all access to
groundwater.*.*.*‘[G]iven that there is a property interest in groundwater,
some manner and degree of groundwater regulation could, under some
facts, effect a compensable taking of property.’.*.*.* [G]roundwater rights
are property rights subject to constitutional protection.” 174
There is no question the power of the legislature to regulate all aspects of
exploring and exploitation of natural resources; Texas has made great leaps
in its history to protect water as a natural and finite resource. 175 “All
170. See generally House Comm. on Energy Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3246,
86th Leg., R.S. (2019) (explaining that operators are less likely to recycle water if they
cannot profit from it).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 833 (Tex. 2012) (describing
the exact situation in which this comment seeks to shed light on).
175. See generally Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 835 (Tex. 2012)
(outlining the way the legislature has historically regulated natural resources).
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property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power.” 176
However, the Texas Supreme Court foreshadowed the issues addressed in
this comment—allowing the operator to gain ownership through a state
action deprives the surface owner “all access to [their] groundwater.”177
Because the Texas Supreme Court has held groundwater rights of the
surface estate are to be constitutionally protected analogous to oil and gas
vested property interests, surface owners looking to challenge Texas
Natural Resource Code Chapter 122.002 could rely on Edwards Aquifer
Auth. v. Day, Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. West, and current operator practices to prove the violation
of Article I § 17 of the Texas Constitution.
V. Conclusion
Looking to evolve and innovate the common practice of post-fracing
waste management, operators invested millions of dollars to recycle postfracing waste water for further use on the same tract of land, on a different
tract of land, or for sale to other industries. By selling recycled water or by
using it on other tracts of land, operators created an economy that not only
reduces their operating costs, but can also be said to limit their
environmental impact. Understanding the balance of rights Texas provides
to both mineral and surface owners, operators looked to the Texas
Legislature to codify this practice and solidify proprietary rights—at the
expense of the surface owners.
The real property doctrine of correlative rights creates a usufruct interest
in the groundwater allowing the operator to use the water to exploit the
minerals for benefit of the land or acreage pooled therewith. The statute
then attempts to expand the usufruct right of use into an ownership interest
in the backflow water. Other states will likely look to House Bill 3246 as a
guide to codifying post-fracing recycled waste. With that being said,
caution must be taken. Correlative rights permeate through American
common law like the hydrocarbons located in fraced fissures, legislatures
must take care to account for them in future legislation.

176. See Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004)
(explaining the scope of police powers that have been allowable by the Texas Legislature).
177. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 835 (Tex. 2012)
(understanding the ownership aspects of groundwater by surface owners).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

